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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals properly has jurisdiction over
this

appeal

pursuant

to

Utah

Code Annotated

§78-2a-3 (2) (k)

(1994) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

After a hearing during which it considered and found

disparate interests among all of the parties, was it proper for
the trial court to allow each of the parties an equal number of
separate peremptory challenges for selecting the jury at trial
in this case?
Since the court's decision was based on a finding of
fact

with

respect

to

the parties' disparate

interests, the

applicable standard of review regarding the Court's decision on
this issue is an abuse of discretion standard.

Margulies by

Marcrulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985).
2.

Based on all of the evidence presented at trial, was

it proper for the trial court to enter judgment on the jury
verdict in this case, with respect to the alleged negligence of
Pleasant Grove City?
In reviewing jury verdicts, the appellate court reviews
evidence in a light most favorable to the findings of the jury
and upholds its verdict so long as there is competent evidence

-1-

to sustain it.

Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808

P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991) .
3.
of-way

Was it proper for the trial court to give a right-

instruction

applicable
language

Utah

of

the

which

state

incorporated

statute,

instruction

to

and

language

refuse

incorporate

to

only

from
limit

an
the

plaintiff's

theory of the facts in this case?
The applicable standard of review on this issue is the
correctness

standard.

Ong

International

(U.S.A.),

Inc., v.

11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).
4.

After

plaintiff

had

introduced

the

testimony

of

accident reconstruction expert Newell Knight at trial, was it
proper

for

the

trial

court

to allow Mr. Knight

to

testify

regarding his expert opinions?
The applicable standard of review on this issue is an
abuse of discretion

standard.

Whitehead v. American Motors

Sales Corporation, 801 P.2d 920, 923-24 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1992).

2.

Utah Code Annotated §41-6-72 (1992).

3.

Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1992).

4.

Rule 611 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1992).

5.

Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1994).
-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's Statement of the Case is accurate with the
following additions:
1.

In

addition

to

denying

their

own

negligence

and

asserting comparative negligence on the part of Ms. Carrier in
their Answers to Ms. Carrier's Complaint, each defendant also
asserted that the accident was caused or contributed to by the
actions of third parties.
2.

Although

(R. 13, 52, 59)

the

trial

schedule,

as

laid

out

by

appellant, is accurate, it should be noted that counsel for Ms.
Carrier

had

represented

to

the

trial

court

in

a

pre-trial

conference that the entire trial would require only one week.
Despite warnings by the trial court to counsel regarding the
consequences of going over the requested six days, by the end
of one week, Ms. Carrier's counsel had not finished putting on
plaintiff's case in chief.

Thus, the trial court was required

to schedule the remainder of the trial as best it could with
the earliest dates available.

(R. 2098, 2177, 2401, 2528-29)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Initially,
appellant's

it

should

be

noted,

with

respect

to

"Statement of Facts," that Ms. Carrier's counsel

has made assertions which are inaccurate and misleading with
reference to the transcript citations.
-3-

Counsel has taken undue

liberties by going beyond the actual testimony contained in the
transcript.
Thus, in addition to objecting to many of the statements
contained in appellant's "Statement of Facts," appellee hereby
submits the following:
1.

On January 15, 1991, William Roger Smith, driving a

van for Pro-Tech Restoration, was traveling south on 500 East,
and approaching

1100 North in Pleasant Grove, Utah.

approached

intersection,

the

he

did

not

see

any

As he
vehicles

approaching 500 East from the east or west on 1100 North.

He

also did not see any stop sign for south bound traffic on 500
East at the intersection of 1100 North.
2.

After

entering

the

(R. 1477, 1486, 1494)

intersection,

he

saw

Ms.

Carrier's vehicle coming fast toward him, and knew she would
not be able to stop on the slushy road.
Carrier's

vehicle

collided

with

the

The front of Ms.

passenger

Smith's vehicle, approximately in the center.

side

of

Mr.

(R. 1489, 1493,

1528)
3.

At the time of the accident, Smith was an individual

working for Pro-Tech, a corporation involved in the business of
restoring carpeting in homes following a flood.

As of July 5,

1991, approximately six months after the accident and prior to

-4-

any depositions in this case, Smith was not employed at all by
Pro-Tech.

(R. 1294, 1365)

4.

On or about January 7, 1992, Ms. Carrier filed suit

against William Roger Smith, Pro-Tech Restoration and Pleasant
Grove

City

for

causing

individually served.
5.

In

her

alleged

injuries,

and

had

each

(R. 6, 19, 45, 127)

response

to

the

Complaint

filed

against

defendants in this case, William Roger Smith prepared his own
handwritten
prepared

response.

by

counsel

Restoration,

denying

Answers
for

to

the

Pleasant

their

own

Grove

Complaint
City

liability,

were

and
and

also

Pro-Tech
asserting

comparative fault on behalf of Ms. Carrier and third parties.
(R. 13, 52, 59, 1295, 1556-57)
6.
Restoration

Although
briefly

the

attorney

attempted

to

representing

Pro-Tech

simultaneously

represent

Smith and Pro-Tech in this matter, it was discovered very early
on that there existed a substantial controversy between Smith
and Pro-Tech, requiring that they retain separate counsel to
represent their disparate interests in this case.

One of the

significant facts contributing to this substantial controversy
between

Smith

and

Pro-Tech

was

that

Smith

alleged

Pro-Tech

Restoration, as Smith's employer, was putting pressure on him

-5-

to lie regarding the circumstances of the accident.

(R. 1295-

1301, 1312, 1515-21)
7.

During the discovery and the course of the trial,

Ms. Carrier's counsel attempted to establish a separate claim
against

Pro-Tech

training theory.
in,

that

based

trial

to

support

distinguished
negligence.

some

sort

of negligent

hiring or

Indeed, it was not until all the evidence was

the

evidence

on

from

court

found

such

its

there

claims

was

not

against

responsibility

for

sufficient

Pro-Tech

Smith's

as

alleged

(R. 1462-63, 1610-15, 1802-1803, 1807-13, 2507,

2521-22)
8.
subject

Subsequent

to

the

intersection

in

accident,

Pleasant

a neighbor

Grove

testified

near
that

the
he

believed the stop sign for the south bound traffic on 500 East
was missing at the time of the accident, but said that the time
it had been missing

was

"no more than a day or so."

The

accident occurred on a Tuesday, and this witness testified that
he did not recall Monday, but could "fairly reasonably say" he
knew "Tuesday it was down."
9.
employee

On
for

the

(R. 1706-1709)

day

prior

to

the

Pleasant

Grove

City

was

subject
out

cindering the roads in the city generally.
recollection,

and

there

is

no
-6-

evidence,

accident,

snowplowing

an
and

However, he had no
that

he

actually

travelled the roads through the intersection which is at issue
in this case.

Further, he did not notice, and there is no

evidence, that the subject stop sign was down at the time he
was plowing

and cindering the roads generally in the city.

(R. 1890-95, 1935)
10.

The

were expected

testimony

from

to be alert

city employees was

that

they

for road signs that were knocked

down, and ideally hoped that such signs would be identified
within minutes or hours.

However, the city employees and an

expert traffic engineer testified that they would not consider
the city's system as having failed or fallen below the required
standard of care, unless it could be shown that the sign had
been

down

for

"a number

of

days."

There was no

evidence

presented to the jury at trial in this case that the subject
stop sign had been down for "a number of days."

(R. 1432,

1440, 1818-1820, 1846-48, 1854-55, 1863, 1869, 1876-78, 1935,
1978, 1981, 2010, 2248-50, 2265-72)
11.
counsel

Prior

filed

peremptory
memoranda

to

the

a motion

trial
to

challenges.

of

this

case, Ms. Carrier's

limit

the

number

Counsel

for

each

of

defendants'

defendant

filed

in opposition to plaintiff's motion, setting forth

the facts and legal arguments supporting the position that each
party

should

be

allowed

an
-7-

equal

number

of

peremptory

challenges

for the selection of the jury in this case.

The

Court was specifically made aware of the separate and different
interests of each defendant in selecting a jury and shifting
the

ultimate

parties

responsibility

involved,

and

for

that

the

accident

significant

on

the

adverse

other

interests

between Smith and Pro-Tech Restoration had required those two
defendants to retain separate counsel.
12.
Motion

Also prior to trial, counsel for Pro-Tech filed a

in

Limine

Statements
Counsel

would

be

of

Exclude
the

Pro-Tech

discredit Pro-Tech.
13.

to

regarding

for

statements

(R. 381, 483, 489, 518)

Prior

circumstances

argued
used,

Smith's

not

to
to

the

of
court

impeach

Inconsistent
the
that

Smith,

accident.
Smith's
but

to

(R. 529)

After a hearing at which he considered the degree

adversity

among

the

defendants,

based

on

the

memoranda

opposing Ms. Carrier's motion and based on his familiarity with
the issues raised during the pre-trial phase of this case, the
Court found interests "disparate enough" to justify giving each
party an equal number of peremptory challenges with which to
select the jury.

(Exhibit 2 to Appellant's Brief, Transcript

July 15, 1993).
14.

On the first day of trial, while

impaneling

the

jury, the Court asked that each party read the names of its
-8-

witnesses to the potential jurors.

Although each defendant had

a separate list of witnesses, counsel for Pro-Tech Restoration
consolidated the lists into one for the purposes of presenting
the names

to the potential

jurors.

The parties,

including

plaintiff, had listed "any witnesses listed by any other party"
as potential witnesses for their case.
15.

In opening

(R. 132, 137, 1164-66)

statements, during

the trial, and in

closing, Ms. Carrier's counsel emphasized the theme of conflict
and disparate interests between Smith and Pro-Tech Restoration,
along with

Pleasant

Grove

City.

That

is a theme that ran

throughout Ms. Carrier's presentation of her case regarding the
issue

of

liability.

Indeed,

Ms.

Carrierfs

counsel,

in

referring back to his opening and all evidence discovered prior
to trial and presented during the trial, described the conflict
and accusations of lying between defendants as the "paramount
issue" in this case.

(R. 1295-1301, 1312, 1515-21, 1537, 1561-

64, 1808, 1822, 1824-28, 2555, 2559, 2573-74, 2734)
16.

Prior to trial, Pleasant Grove City retained the

services of Newell Knight as an accident reconstruction expert.
Pro-Tech Restoration retained the services of Thomas Blotter as
its accident reconstruction expert.

Smith did not retain the

services of a third accident reconstruction expert.
137, 356)
-9-

(R. 132,

17.
Newell

Counsel

Knight,

and

for

Ms.

Carrier

cross-examined

took

him

his opinions and the bases for such.

the

deposition

extensively

of

regarding

In addition, counsel for

Pro-Tech questioned Mr. Knight in his deposition regarding his
opinion of whether Smith entered the intersection first, and
what

that

would

mean

in

terms

of

right-of-way,

given

understanding and experience with the Utah Traffic Code.

his
(R.

1075, pp. 81-82)
18.

At

trial, counsel

for Pleasant

Grove, which had

retained Mr. Knight, elected not to call him as a witness;
therefore, counsel for Ms. Carrier requested the opportunity to
read to the jury portions of Newell Knight's cross-examination
from

his

deposition

transcript.

Counsel

for

Pro-Tech

Restoration objected to the reading of the deposition and to
Newell Knight's

testimony.

The Court allowed Ms. Carrier's

counsel to present Newell Knight's deposition testimony to the
jury,

but

required,

since

he

was

available

and

ready

testify, that Newell Knight take the stand as a witness.

to
Ms.

Carrier's counsel then proceeded to have Newell Knight testify
extensively
examination.

from

his

deposition

with

respect

to his cross-

Counsel for Pro-Tech Restoration then questioned

Mr. Knight, as had been done in the deposition, regarding his
opinion of whether Smith entered the intersection first, and
-10-

what

that

would

mean

in

terms

of

right-of-way,

given

understanding and experience with the Utah Traffic Code.

his
(R.

2403-2404, 2439, 2457, 2473, 2477, 1075, pp. 81-82)
19.

Ms.

Carrier's

counsel

objected

to

Mr.

Knight's

testimony regarding his opinions, stating that such was beyond
the

scope

of

his

"direct

examination".

However, the court

explained that it had granted all parties examination outside
the scope of either cross or direct throughout the trial, and,
since Mr. Knight was there available to testify, he did not
feel

it

necessary

testimony.

to

impose

Mr. Knight

the

formality

had been

called

of

limiting

as an expert,

his
duly

qualified, and testified within the scope of that expertise.
(R. 2525)
20.

Ms. Carrier's own accident reconstruction expert,

Rudy Limpert, was also allowed to testify regarding his opinion
on the right-of-way issue between Smith and Ms. Carrier.

(R.

1760)
21.

With regard to jury instructions proposed prior to

trial, counsel for Pro-Tech proposed an instruction on rightof-way,
72(1)

containing

and

(2).

the verbatim

However,

language

counsel

from U.C.A.

§41-6-

for Ms. Carrier objected,

requesting the court to limit the instruction to the language
of subsection (2) only.

Counsel for Pleasant Grove proposed an
-11-

instruction from MUJI, which paraphrases the language from both
subsections.
22.

(R. 560, 558, 620, 597, 683, 646)
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court

used the MUJI

instruction

suggested by counsel

for

Pleasant

Grove and instructed the jury regarding the law, as paraphrased
from Utah Code Annotated §41-6-72(1) and (2), without assuming
the existence of any controverted issue of fact in favor of any
party.

Ms. Carrier's counsel admitted that, "in essence, [his]

instruction was given" as part of Instruction #31, and that the
instruction

"combines

statutes into one."

both

of

the

potentially

applicable

Counsel was also permitted to argue his

view point on the instruction in closing.

(R. 781, Instruction

#31, attached as Exhibit 3 to Appellant's Brief; R. 2533, 2538,
2586-88)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court, after a hearing at which it considered
the degree of adverseness among the defendants, correctly found
that

the

justify

defendants'
giving

challenges

each

interests
party

for selecting

an

were

"disparate

equal

number

enough"

to

of

peremptory

the jury in this case.

Since the

trial court's decision to grant each party an equal number of
peremptory challenges was based on a finding of fact regarding
the degree of adverseness among the defendants, this decision
-12-

can only be upset on appeal upon a showing by appellant that
the

trial

court

abused

its discretion.

In this

case, Ms.

Carrier cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding sufficient adverseness among the parties to justify
allowing each party an equal number of peremptory challenges.
The plain language of Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that "each party" is entitled to three
peremptory challenges.

The qualifying language in subsection

(c) of Rule 47, regarding multiple parties on "either side,"
was previously defined by the Utah Supreme Court to mean that
co-parties are not deemed to be on the same side of a lawsuit
if it is found "their interests are truly adverse."
trial

court,

after

considering

circumstances

in

this

case,

interests were

sufficiently

all

found

of

that

the
the

Since the
particular
defendants'

adverse, it was not an abuse of

discretion to allow each party an equal number of peremptory
challenges for selecting the jury.

The decision by the trial

court was consistent with the language of Rule 47, and the
controlling Utah Supreme Court opinion interpreting the rule.
Further,

the

existence

or

absence

of

a

cross-claim

between defendants is not the sole and controlling factor as to
whether

a

"substantial

warrant

allowing

each

controversy"
party

separate
-13-

exists,

sufficient

peremptory

to

challenges.

Indeed,

in the present

case, where, despite the absence of

actual cross-claims being
giving

rise

to

a

filed, significant

"substantial

factors

controversy"

existed

between

the

defendants, it was proper for the court, after considering the
degree of adverseness among the parties, to allow each party an
equal number of peremptory challenges for selecting the jury.
Ms. Carrier's counsel admitted that Pleasant Grove City
had

sufficient

challenges.
Carrier's

In
counsel

disparate
addition,
in

interests
much

pre-trial

of

to
the

warrant
emphasis

discovery

and

separate
by

Ms.

during

the

presentation of evidence at trial was on the existence of a
conflict or controversy between the other two defendants, ProTech and Smith, regarding allegations of lying with respect to
critical facts in the case.
to

evidence

demonstrated

found

Indeed, at trial, making reference

through pre-trial

through

the

testimony

discovery
presented

and
at

allegedly

trial, Ms.

Carrier's counsel himself described the issue of conflict and
controversy among the defendants as the "paramount issue" in
this case.
Since each of the defendants in this case had unique
interests

in

the

type

of

jury

to

be

selected,

due

to

"substantial controversies" between them, it was fair and not

-14-

an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow each party
the same opportunity to select jurors.
With respect to the jury's verdict regarding
Grove

City's

alleged

negligence,

such

was

Pleasant

supported

by

sufficient competent evidence at trial, and therefore must be
upheld on appeal.
as required

Ms. Carrier failed to marshal the evidence,

for a proper appeal of the jury's verdict, and

therefore the Court should summarily affirm the jury's verdict
regarding

Pleasant

Grove

City's

alleged

negligence

in

this

case.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by a complete marshaling
of

the

evidence

supporting

the

jury's

verdict

regarding

Pleasant Grove City's alleged negligence, there was more than
sufficient competent evidence supporting the verdict, and hence
the jury's verdict must stand.

In short, the testimony and

evidence presented at trial is more than sufficient for a jury
to reasonably conclude that the city's actions were within the
acceptable

standard

of

care

for

discovering

and

replacing

downed stop signs, as testified to by all experts at trial,
including Ms. Carrier's own expert.
With respect to the jury instruction given by the Court
regarding

the

right-of-way

between

drivers

approaching

an

intersection, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the
-15-

jury based on the language of the applicable statute in the
Utah Traffic Code, without regard to any party's version of a
controverted fact.

Considering the language of the right-of-

way instruction given, and the instructions given as a whole,
it cannot be said that Ms. Carrier was refused the opportunity
to have her theory of the case submitted to the jury.
it was proper

for the

trial

existence of a controverted

court

Instead,

to refuse to assume

the

fact in favor of any party, and

instead give an instruction to the jury incorporating the law
from

both

potentially

applicable

provisions

regarding right-of-way at intersections.

of

the

statute

Since Ms. Carrier has

failed to show that any confusion resulted from the right-ofway instruction given, or that any alleged confusion from the
instruction was substantial and prejudicial, her claim of error
regarding the instruction must be rejected.
Finally, following Ms. Carrier's introduction of Newell
Knight's

testimony

into the

trial, it was not

an abuse

of

discretion for the trial court to allow Mr. Knight to testify
regarding his expert opinions, and the bases thereof.

Prior to

trial, counsel for Ms. Carrier deposed Newell Knight, at which
time counsel for Pro-Tech questioned him regarding his opinion
of

whether

therefore

Smith
have

entered
the

the

intersection

right-of-way
-16-

based

first, and
on

Mr.

would

Knight's

understanding

and

experience

with

the

Utah

Traffic

Code.

Nevertheless, with knowledge that Mr. Knight had testified in
his

deposition

that

it

was

his

opinion

Smith

was

in

the

intersection first and would therefore have the right-of-way,
counsel for Ms. Carrier chose to call Mr. Knight and introduce
the

cross-examination

from

his

deposition.

By

choosing

to

introduce Newell Knight's testimony, Ms. Carrier chose to take
the risk that Mr. Knight would testify the same as in his pretrial

deposition

regarding

his

conclusions

addition to the bases for such.
that

the

Knight

trial

to

be

court

abused

questioned

opinions, in

Since Ms. Carrier cannot show

its discretion

and

and

testify

in allowing Mr.

regarding

his

expert

opinion, the trial court's judgment should not be disturbed by
this court on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT THE ADVERSENESS BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS
WARRANTED GIVING EACH PARTY AN EQUAL
NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN THIS CASE.
The trial court's decision to grant each party an equal
number of peremptory challenges in this case was not based on a
"misreading of Rule 47," as claimed by appellant in her brief,
but rather based on a finding of fact regarding the degree of
adverseness

between defendants, thus requiring

the

Court to

apply Rule 4 7 as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Sutton
-17-

v. Otis, 249 P. 437 (Utah 1926), and followed by the Court in a
decision decided subsequent to this case.
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993).

Randle v. Allen, 862

Under such circumstances, the appellate

court applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the
trial court's decision.

Marcrulies by Maraulies v. Upchurch,

696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985)
Appellant's

claim

that

the

trial

court

erred

in

allowing each party an equal number of peremptory challenges in
this case is based on three arguments which failed for reasons
explained below.
First, Ms. Carrier argues that the trial court erred in
failing

to

comply with Rule

Procedure.

47 of the Utah Rules of

Civil

However, it should initially be pointed out that

the plain language of Rule 47(e) provides that "each party" is
entitled

to

appellant's
language

in

three

argument

peremptory
fails

subsection

(c)

challenges.

to recognize
of

Rule

47,

that

In

addition,

the

qualifying

regarding

multiple

parties on "either side," had been previously defined by the
Utah Supreme Court to mean that co-parties are not deemed to be
on the same side of a lawsuit if it is found their "interests
are truly adverse."

Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah

1993) (citing Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85, 141, 249 P. 437, 45758 (1926).)
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""•-- p r e s e n t

case,

t h e trial

court

thus

did not

m i s i n t e r p r e t Rule 4 7 of t h e I It ah Ri lies of C i v i l P x o c e d u r e , b u t
r atl - L :.\ciu-..parties,
based

act i ial fi nd i rig r egarding the adverseness of the

and then

on

that

correctly

i±ndin~

=;;. iied

101

th-

anu 1 .'

"

existing
:

c-arr ^

challenges, as directed i_y the Utah ^^pieme Coui
in rr/.u ca.c e heard

com :

argument:

'

"cunsel,

standard,

--<=y~.

..^

..^x

and had the

?repf ;:. nl 11 it

benr ^ diriereni

aetendan.o
parties

challenges

c\

for th

were

"disparate enougn" to considei

separate

"sides."

selection

"hereby

warranting

of the i : > , pursuant

each
the

to the

language of P u l ^ &" ^nd t h Q controlling ^ o r e m e •'"'•'•Tt opinion.
_*- _ erred in
granting

each

* peremptory

challenges

since nc -ross-claims hid been fi.l^d "in t-hin case.

Appellant

bases

part * an equal

•

that

a

side

of

alienage in I tie Handle opinion, stating

"substantial
a

:,amrr-;

lawsuit

controversy"
has

a

exists when

cross claim

a party

against

a

on one

co-party.

Howe ) ei # appel 1 ai it' 3 i: el iai l ze • : i I ti i<= J : i ^.. •" • 1 .". .-...ju-igc L . Lhe
Randle opinion

:c d i s p l a c e d

since

t h e Court: d i e :ci s a y that

the absence c^ a ^xied cross-claim is the sole ana concron
._.ipr a

. j D s t a r c ^ controversy" exists

>

say that a "substantial controversy" exists when a party has a
cross-claim against a co-party is not the equivalent of saying
that a "substantial controversy" cannot exist when no crossclaims are filed.

In other words, although a cross-claim is

one factor indicating a "substantial controversy" sufficient to
justify separate peremptory challenges, it is certainly not the
sole and controlling factor, and the absence of such is not
determinative on the issue.
The reason the Court in Randle focused on the fact that
UDOT and the County had not filed cross-claims against

each

other in that case was that no other factors existed, as they
do

in

the

present

case,

demonstrating

a

"substantial

controversy" or disparate interests between the two defendants
in selecting a jury.
the

absence

of

factors

existed

between

the

considering

Thus, in the present case, where, despite

actual
giving

defendants,

cross-claims
rise

to

a

being

filed,

"substantial

it was proper

significant
controversy"

for the Court, after

the degree of adverseness

among the parties, to

allow each party an equal number of peremptory challenges for
selecting the jury.
Third,
"substantial

Ms.

Carrier

controversy"

claims

that

sufficient

to

defendants
warrant

lacked
the

a

trial

court's allowance of an equal number of peremptory challenges
-20-

to each party.
that

In support of this argument, M s . Carrier claims

defendants

never

offered

fa" t_ s

any

substantial c • : i 11::i : o ai . : . •_ - .-. -.*•.
The

facts

demonstrating

were before
l

the Court

'

the defendants'

several

demonstrate ng

a

i: ip] y i 1 :)t: ti ue .

disparate

interests

t i mes prior to tri al, and were

.1 ed by 1:1 le Cc»i 11: t at tl le time of the hearing

..*...

held prior to aeny.r-g M s . Carrier's motion to limit the number
ui

challenges

arguments
whether

to defendants,

"he •^-•:--

from ail parties regarding dista.iate
such

number
latei

allowed

were

r

sufficient

.

icxxowea anc appliec

..Pereses, ana

-x :h party

to award

-"»•*

— -^-h-^r^n

--

an

equal

Sutton ^ s t ,

the Supreme

Jcuii: . r> Randie v.

A l i e n , supra.

the

attempL

brief

that

J a m e x • s counsel,

ro side-ster

..

Crove

C:*y had

.-epai :* ••
Briei

Transcript

indicates
. :.L*. :r;o:.::,

that

-~

conceded
sufficient

.?;iie^.g-::.::July

:':. ,

;iad considered
" -.'. J-iI.

ana . .i no:, dispute i.nat
disoarat-

o--*-.. . • .
\y?.

.<\r. " "

to her

'Appellant ! s Brief,

ihe prior admission

Carrier'^ counsel

Pleasant

. footnote

\
~he

i^Ua.:..):^

:

nterests
•^ U - .

-ijaicic

ne

Court

"-sue and felt
.

the
}

c .1 1

equal number of peremptory challenges for each party.
trial,

making

reference

to evidence

found

through

Id.

At

pre-trial

discovery, Ms. Carrier's counsel himself described the issue
of conflict

and controversy among all the defendants as the

"paramount issue" in this case.

(R. 2555)

Since it may always be said that all defendants have a
common interest in shifting comparative fault to the plaintiff
or plaintiffs

in any given

case, the focus needs to be on

whether a "substantial controversy" exists between the parties
giving rise to different

interests in selecting a jury.

If

each of the defendants has a unique interest in the type of
jury they would like to have seated due to disparate interests
or

"substantial controversies" between them, then it is only

fair that they each should have the same opportunity as the
plaintiff to select jurors and attempt to seat the type of jury
from whom they each believe they would obtain the best result.
See Randle v. Allen, 862 P. 2d at 1333, where the court based
its decision, in part, on the fact that "Allen's interest in
choosing jurors aligned him with both plaintiff and the other
defendants."

(Emphasis added)

In Randle, UDOT and the County did not have
interests

in

selecting

a

jury.

separate

They were not at odds and

accusing each other of lying, as were Smith and Pro-Tech in the
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present

case.

They were

both governmental

identical interests, not only
c J a:i iiis

1: i, i t a ] , = • : :I

entities

:: defending against

- :•-•.-••

•<

and had

plaintiff's

-

,:,: .-.; f Q1 • u ]L =

j urors t o 1 lave .
Smith and ?ro- T ^rr

Ir. contrast-

* - * te present case not

*

/ accusing

each other or lying regarding critical
also

had very

^ n t , erests

different

tii-}

.

employer,

c-aimin::

disgruntled

former

.. ..i" :L -::.r y —.. .
employer
Under

to have

been

employee-driver.

r

*s ir. * he case,

~'^ *" •

°r>ecific

. _

is a corporate

subject

to lies

disparate interests

Sm. "

the circumstances

of the

,,

J^V.:.!.^

w.. ^io.:~

was the existence of such disparate interests and
•*"rtroversy"

that i eauired

-liferent

counsel.

Carrier's

o w n strategy

significant

"

.Lz> former
accident.

"substantial

separate i epresental :. i : • : • f • = a i : 1 l ] : y

Further,

the record

:: trial

cc *

nounsux

. ndeed,

sought

reflects

•^^.-••*..-c
•uMuiizca

i^n^

.

that M s .

to emphasize the
Indeed, M s .

Losing

that this was the "paramount issue" in this case.
T

i

- .v

sue:

Carrier's

attitudes

- Aiming to have been prejoui^j ^ y

to lie regarding

but

: i :i j: 1:: : f t:l I =

b y stating
(R. 2555)
] :i i i 1:::1 :i :i 3

case further illustrate the emphasis by Ms. Carrier's counsel
on

the

theme

of

conflict

among

the

defendants,

including

repeated accusations of lying and manipulating evidence on the
part of all defendants:
Smith cancelled his original deposition in
order to retain his own separate counsel due to
significant
hostility and conflict between
himself
and
his
former employer, Pro-Tech.
(R. 1295-1301, 1312)
Counsel for Pro-Tech moved for a mistrial
due to Ms. Carrier's counsel's focus on the
controversy between Pro-Tech and Smith during his
opening statement. (R. 1325-27)
Counsel
for Pro-Tech, in his opening
statement, reacted to the theme of conflict and
disparate interests between Smith and Pro-Tech,
and pointed out that it was probably designed to
help Smith only at Pro-Tech's expense. (R. 13 6366)
Counsel for Smith also dealt with the
conflict issue between Smith and Pro-Tech in his
opening statement. (R. 13 74)
Ms. Carrier's counsel attempted to establish
a separate negligent hiring theory as to ProTech, based on its failure to check Smith's
driving record. (R. 1462-63, 1610-15, 1802-1803,
1807-13)
Ms.
Carrier's counsel brought
out on
examination of Smith his allegation of being
instructed by the principals of Pro-Tech to lie
regarding how the accident happened. Counsel for
Pro-Tech was surprised by some of Smith's
testimony.
(R. 1515-21)
The theme of conflict was extensively
brought out during Smith's testimony, including
emphasis on the fact that Smith had filed his own
-24-

Answer, and made inconsistent prior statements
after allegedly being directed by Pro-Tech
principals to lie regarding the circumstances of
the accident.
Ms. Carrier's counsel displayed
these prior statements to the -^•*~" ~n an overhead
projector during examination.
1524-1562,
v-.
1537, 1552, 1556-57, 1561-64)
Counsel for Ms. Carrier emphasized the theme
of dishonesty between Smith and Pro-Tech during
examination of one of the principals for ProTech.
(R. 1808, 1822, 1824-28)
The co'ui t did i lot conclude, until after all
evidence was in, that no evidence suppoi ted the
separate claim that Pro-Tech acted negligently,
independent of Smith's actions, in causing the
accident.
It was only at that point that Ms.
Carrier's counsel argued that there was no more
need for separate representation of Pro-Tech.
(R. 2507, 2521-22)
Counsel for Pro-Tech argued that he took
exception to the court's Instruction #14 since he
said it: lumped the defendants together and gave
the jury the wrong impression as to the dichotomy
between defendants. (R, 2540)
The conflict ii I lying between Pro-Tech and
Smith was referred to by Ms. Carrier's counsel in
closing as the "paramount issue" in this case.
In that regard, he identified the "finger
pointing"
between
Pro-Tech
and
Smi th as
significant:
(R. 2555, 2559, 2573-74)
Counsel for Pro-Tech discussed the lying
accusations between Pro-Tech and Smith in his
closing.
(R 2677-78)
Counsel for Smith, during his closing, also
discussed the conflict between Pro-Tech and
Smith, requiring him to be hired as separate
counsel early on in this case. (R. 2698-99)

Finally, it is misleading for appellant to say that the
defendants in Randle received only four additional challenges.
In

Randle,

all

three

defendants

were

awarded

separate

challenges for a total of 12, and four total to plaintiff.

The

Court's holding in Randle was that, since there was no showing
of a "substantial controversy" between UDOT and the County, the
three

defendants

should

have been

allowed

only two sets of

peremptory challenges, for a total of eight, compared to the
four awarded to plaintiff.
In the present case, "substantial controversies" existed
between all three defendants, thus warranting an equal number
of peremptory challenges for each party in selecting the jury.
Counsel for Ms. Carrier has admitted that he "clearly will not
dispute Pleasant Grove City has disparate interests," which is
not

surprising given the fact that Pro-Tech Restoration

and

Smith aligned with plaintiff in their adverseness to Pleasant
Grove City.
the

Ms. Carrier, Pro-Tech and Smith all claimed that

accident,

alleged

at

negligence

downed stop sign.

least
in

in part, was

failing

caused

to notice

by

and/or

(R. 1842-44, 2680-81, 1370-74)

the

City's

replace

the

In addition,

as previously discussed, Smith and Pro-Tech not only had the
"substantial controversy" between them of accusing each other
of lying regarding critical facts in the case, but also had
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very different interests with respect to the type of jurors to
be selected.
= .3 :

considering
parties,
just: fy

L:^

found
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SINCE THE J D R Y ^ v^iiDICT REGARDING
PLEASANT GROVE CITY'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE
WAS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE A T TRIAL, THE JURY'S FINDING
MUST BE UPHELD.
lx-

Initia 11 y, i t should be noted that appe 11 ant" s statement:
tl lat

the

j ur }

reached

its

City's alleged negligence,

verdict

"in spite

regarding
-:

-stimony by

outset,

.

-_should

.ty employee so test-i. . A.
,oe noted

that

Grove

Pleasant

si rnp] \ r not tin le .

G r n v ^ employees *- r ~ the City had f aiie-"
^dbd.

Pleasant

I '"uither, at the

appellai • has misstated

the

standard for reviev:ina ^'irv verdicts as it;;;ring "si lbstai It:i a ]
e vidence."

i \ lthough there was substantia_ evidence

presented

at trial supporting the jury s verdict, the standard is not one
of

"substantial evider. ~- » --27-

* r*e.

Instead,

the Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that a jury verdict
will

be

upheld

on

appeal

"so

long

as

there

is

competent

evidence to sustain it."

Rees v. Intermountain Health Care,

Inc. , 808 P.2d 1069, 1072

(Utah 1991) .

In the present case,

there was more than sufficient competent evidence to sustain
the

jury's

verdict

regarding

Pleasant

Grove

City's

alleged

negligence.
Under Utah law, in order to find a party liable under a
theory

of

negligence,

it

must

be

found

that

a

duty

of

reasonable care was owed to the party seeking recovery, that
there was a breach of that duty, and that such breach was a
proximate cause of the injuries claimed by the party seeking
recovery.

In appealing the jury's finding regarding Pleasant

Grove City's alleged negligence in this case, Ms. Carrier bears
the heavy burden of being required to marshal "every scrap" of
competent

evidence

introduced

at

trial

which

supports

the

jury's verdict, and then demonstrating fatal flaws in all of
that evidence.

Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872 P. 2d

1051, 1052 (Utah App. 1994).
In Oneida, the Utah Court of Appeals further explained
the

requirement

of

marshaling

the

evidence,

and

consequences for failing to do so, as follows:
Utah appellate courts do not take trial
courts' factual findings lightly. We repeatedly
-28-

the

have set forth the heavy burden appellants must
bear when challenging factual findings.
To
successfully appeal a trial court•s finding of
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's
advocate.
"[Attorneys]
must
extri c a t e
[themselves] from, the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position.
In order to
properly discharge the [marshaling] duty..., the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings the appellant resists." ...
This i igorous standard reiiccL^ die doctrine
that appellate courts "do not sit ^~o retry cases
submitted on disputed facts.'
Accordingly,
" [w] hen the duty to marshal is not properly
discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of
challenges
to the findings and accept the
f indings as va1id "

The deference we afford -,.,.• .rial courts'
findings is based on and fosters the principle
that traditional fact finders, whether judges or
juries, are better equipped to consider, weigh,
and assess the evidence that litigants bring
before the courts
When appellants iz no: marshal the evidence
in support of z-'
: findings, they place
appellees
or
„espon_i^ncs
in a precarious
position
In short, appellees are constrained
to
do
the
appellant's
work, usually
at
considerable time and expense.
When appellants
challenge findings of fact, fairness requires
that they bear the costs of demonstrating how the
trial court found those facts from the evidence
and why those findings contradict the weight of
the evidence.
1052-1054 (c:i tations omitted and emphasis added) .

Ms.

Carrier

has

failed

to

marshal

the

evidence,

as

required for a proper appeal of the jury's verdict regarding
Pleasant Grove City's alleged negligence in this case.
as

was

criticized

and

Oneida, Ms. Carrier

found

insufficient

has merely presented

by

this

carefully

Indeed,
Court

in

selected

facts and excerpts of trial testimony, which does not begin to
marshal
case,

the

evidence

supporting

the

jury's verdict

and does nothing more than slightly

in

illustrate

raised for the jury's determination at trial.

this

issues

Since Pleasant

Grove City is unwilling to rely solely on its assertion that
Ms. Carrier has failed to marshal the evidence, it has been
compelled to do the appellant's work and perform the marshaling
process

at

considerable

time

and

expense.

The

evidence

supporting the jury's verdict regarding the alleged negligence
of Pleasant Grove City in this case is as follows:
At the scene of the subject accident, as
soon as officer Randy Shepherd received first
notice that the stop sign was missing, the city
workers were contacted immediately.
They came
right out and had a temporary stop sign put up at
the intersection.
(R. 1408)
Officer Randy Shepherd testified that he
keeps a lookout for downed stop signs without
regard to what shift he may be working, 24 hours
a day, 365 days a year. (R. 1432)
Officer Shepherd did not know how long the
subject stop sign had been down at the time of
the accident. (R. 1440)
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O n i c e r Shepherd testitied I. hat there was
more snow and slush on 500 East than there was on
1100 North
{e could not recall
observing
whether ~n'~ .L^SL had even been plowed,
(R. 1441,
1444)
Officer Shepherd said he probably did not
patrol up 110 0 North during the day of the
accident,
until
responding
to
the
accident,
because it was a busy day.
Also, he says in
early 1991, he would not have typically patrolled
a dead-end street like 500 East.
(R. 1447-48)
Officer
broken stop
and said he
snow
(R 1

Shepherd observed the stump fi on i the
sign at the scene of the accident,
did not recall it being covered with
44 8)

William, Roger Smith did not recall being in
ti le vicinity of the subject intersection prior to
the day of the accident, and says it was only
after the collision that he noticed that the stop
sign, usually in place for south bound traffic on
500 East, was missing.
(R. 1470, VrSf, 1574-75)
Arlen
Shupe
testified
unat
^e
did
not
believe 500 East had been plowed at the ti me of
the accident
(R ] 63 3)
A
witness
and
neighbor
to
the
subject
intersection, Mr, Holdaway, testified that his
memory of the missing stop sign was "very vague,"
and that it was difficult for him "to say that it
had been down any length of time." Mr. Holdaway
testified tnat he traveled the street himself
virtually every day, and did not recall the stop
sign being down for any significant length of
time,
(R ] 706)
Mr. Holdaway
further testified
that
his
recollection would be that the stop sign was down
"not more than a day or so."
The accident
occurred on Tuesday, and Mr. Holdaway said "I
wouldn't think it would have been down more than,
say, Monday. "
'P
^ ~, o *

Joe
Stone,
a principal
of
Pro-Tech
Restoration, testified that he did not remember
receiving any information from Roger Smith's wife
or Arlen Shupe, after their interviews of several
neighbors to the intersection, regarding how long
the stop sign might have been down. (R. 1818-20)
Pleasant Grove City's police chief testified
that the city had seven patrolmen employed at the
time of the accident. Further, he said that only
one officer would be on duty in the whole city
from 3 a.m. until 6:30 a.m., and that thereafter
there is still just one officer on duty, but he
can call on detectives or others for help.
(R.
1832, 1866)
Pleasant Grove police officers were informed
of their duty to keep a lookout for downed stop
signs, and the city street department shared that
responsibility.
Pleasant Grove's police chief
testified that he emphasized this in meetings at
least once or twice a year, and that it was also
part of their training. (R. 1846-47)
The police chief testified that the officers
keep a lookout for downed stop signs 24 hours a
day as best they can, recognizing they have lots
of other things to do. If a downed stop sign is
noticed or reported, it is replaced immediately,
even if it is in the middle of the night.
(R.
1848-49)
The
investigating
officer
and
street
department employees acted in conformity with
this policy, once they were made aware of the
missing stop sign in this case. (R. 1851)
Pleasant Grove's police chief testified that
he expected downed signs to be noticed and
replaced "as soon as possible."
If it were
discovered that a sign had been down "for days,"
he would instruct the street department and
officers to be more efficient. (R. 1854-55)
The police chief did not know how long the
stop sign had been down in this case. (R. 1863)
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The police chief testified that: the Pleasant
Grove police officers are required to respond to
calls first.
This makes general patrolling much
less frequent on snowy days.
During the day
shifts, a lot of times, they are just x tinning
from call to call.
(R. 1864-66)
The police chief testified that it would be
very unlikely, in a 24 hour period, that an
officer would pat re 1 a dead end, street si ich as
500 Easr
R. 1867
T^o .- ~, .xv_c: ^ix±ef, s exptntuL',
~
.* L „^ +
years at Pleasant Grove was that the system for
identifying downed signs has been very effective.
He said that police officers have called several
times within a given month regarding signs, and
that
they
have
also
received
periodic
not i f i cat ions from c i t iz ens.
{R ] 8 6 9)
Dave Frye, the person in charge of signs
witl i the Pleasant Grove Street Department,
testified that he does an annual inventory of all
signs in the city.
He has done so for eight or
nine years, and is very familiar with the signs
in the city. He further testified that he kept a
lookout for downed stop signs prior to the
accident:
(R 18 76-78)
Dave Frye, also responsible for running a.
snowplow for Pleasant Grove City, testified that
they would always plow the streets around schools
and other problem areas first.
He said they
would then plow collector and other main roads,
and widen such, before moving on to other roads.
(R. 1890-91)
Dave Frye had . _ j ....-„•. iecci... . : - ^w^n^
1100 North and 500 East on January :-, : r 15,
1991.
(R. 1 8 95)
Dave Frye would usually plow other collector
routes and problem areas before ever getting to
110 0 North.
He said he does not have to go
through the subject intersection in order to get
-33•

to other collector routes or problem areas.
1918, 1921)

(R.

Dave Frye testified that his routine for
plowing the streets in the city is different
every time.
He also said he has to respond to
calls in other parts of the whole city, as needed
during any given day. (R. 1922, 1925)
During the course of Dave Frye's testimony,
the trial court sustained numerous objections by
defendants on the basis that the testimony sought
by plaintiff's counsel regarding how many times
Mr. Frye may have been through the subject
intersection was too speculative.
(R. 1897,
1910, 1919, 1927, 1931)
Dave Frye testified that he had no idea how
long the stop sign had been missing.
(R. 1935)
Dave Frye testified that he had never
knocked over a stop sign in his experience of
eight or nine years with the Pleasant Grove City
Street Department, and was not aware of any other
employees of the department ever knocking one
down.
(R. 1935)
Dave Frye testified that he did not know
what time he would have started plowing the roads
in general on January 15, 1991. He said that, if
it snowed for two or three days, he probably
would never get all of the city streets done at
any one time.
There is always a part of his
regular route he does not get to during a good
snow storm.
He said that dead-end streets such
as 5 00 East are towards the bottom of his
priority list. (R. 1936-37, 1942)
Dennis Carter, head of the Pleasant Grove
City Street Department, testified that he had no
me^mory of doing any grading in Dave Frye' s
plowing area on January 15, 1991. (R. 1954)
Mr. Carter testified that no members of the
city street crew have ever knocked over stop
signs while plowing to his knowledge. (R. 1962)
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Mr. Carter _ . _ ^ „„^
.*r
.^
^
the
streets in Pleasant Grove City would have been
plowed by the time he and his crew went home from
work on January 15, 1991. He said that dead-end
roads such as 500 East are the last thing plowed,
and it is possible they could have forgotten some
of them.
This is affected by the amount and
consistency of the snow that day.
In that
regard, it snowed all day long <
Tanuaiy " ",
] 99]

':;....-.

Carter testified that, when you are
dixViuy a snowplow, you're concentrating on the
equipment and more than normal on other traffic,
since you don't always stop. (R, 196 8)
Pleasant Grove City Public Wci:ks Director,
Mike Mills, testified that he wanes stop signs
back up "as soon as possible," and that they all
work together in the city to identify and replace
downed or missing stop signs as soon as possible,
24 hours a d^y, 365 days a year
(R 1976, 1978)
Mills said he expected that the system
in place at ::he time of the accident would notify
t hem "very s oon" after a s i gn wa s down
'^
1981)
Mr. Mills said that, generally speaking, the
subject intersection was not a busy one since it
fed off a dead-end street, (R. 2 984)
At the time of the accident, there were only
three full time employees in the city street
department, and they would have to borrow from
other departments when they needed extra help.
(R. 1 986-87)
Mr. Mills testified that, in hi s nine years'
experience with the city, people in Pleasant
Grove have been very conscientious in calling
regarding downed stop signs. He said they have
received periodic notices from, bus drivers,
police department, public works emp] oyees, and
citizens.
(R. 1988-89)
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Mr. Mills testified that it had snowed all
day January 15, 1991, and it was most likely that
the street crew did not get to all the roads in
the city.
He said that, after 12 hours of
plowing, they have to give the drivers 5 or 6
hours break. Then they are back out by 10 or 11
p.m. until early morning, and then back home to
rest during the day.
They can't expect drivers
to plow more than 12 hours a day. (R. 1991-92)
Ms.
Carrier's
expert, Bruce
Reading,
testified that his opinion of a city's role in
providing a surveillance team for identifying
downed signs was consistent with that described
by the police chief as existing in Pleasant Grove
at the time of the accident.
He also admitted
that the city "acted very well" once notice of
the downed sign was actually received.
(R. 2010,
2014)
Ms. Carrier's expert also admitted that
there were no written standards specifying the
amount of time a sign may be down before it
should be discovered, and has never taught such a
specific standard in road school.
He admitted
that a 24 hour standard would be acceptable. (R.
2015-16)
Highway safety and traffic engineer, Art
Guerts, testified that Pleasant Grove City's
system for locating and replacing downed stop
signs is similar to other systems employed in the
State of Utah in all respects. (R. 2248)
Mr. Guerts testified that, based on the
testimony of the stop sign being down no more
than "a day or so, " and on the testimony
regarding the possible times the city employees
could have been through the intersection, it was
his expert opinion that the city's conduct and
that of its employees was within the acceptable
standard of care for a city in maintaining stop
signs.
(R. 2248-50)
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Mr. Guerts further testified that the system
used in Pleasant Grove City was the best we have
in an imperfect world.
The system is no
different than that utilized by Salt Lake City
and the Department of Transportation.
(R. 2250)
Mr. Guerts disagreed with Frank Mills'
testimony that the system would have failed if
the sign had been missing unnoticed for two or
three days.
(R. 2265-67)
Mr. Guerts explained that he did not
disagree with the city's "hopes and aspirations"
regarding how soon after they wanted to have
downed stop signs noticed, but disagreed that
minutes or hours instead of days was a reasonable
expectation. (R. 2266-72)
The jury verdict regarding the issue of
Pleasant Grove City's alleged negligence was
unanimous, with every juror finding that the
evidence presented showed Pleasant Grove City was
not negligent in this case. (R. 2764)
Further, although there cannot be cites to the record
regarding what was not shown, it should be noted that, often,
the

most

important

aspect

to

a

trial

evidence, not the evidence produced.
the

length of

time

the

subject

is

the

absence

of

In this case, regarding

stop sign was down and the

possible notice of such to the city, all Ms. Carrier had were
possibilities, but no evidence that the sign was down for an
unreasonable period.
Since
supporting

Ms.

Carrier

failed

to

marshal

the

evidence

the jury's verdict, as demonstrated by the above

examples from the record, this Court should summarily hold that
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the jury's findings were supported by the evidence, and affirm
the

jury's

verdict

regarding

Pleasant

Grove

City's

alleged

negligence in this case.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the above marshaling of
the evidence, more than sufficient competent evidence supported
the

jury's

verdict

regarding

Pleasant

Grove

City's

negligence, and hence the jury's verdict must stand.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, at 1072.
Krauss v. Utah State Department
1014

(Utah

App.

1993),

where

of Transportation,
this

Court

stated

alleged
Rees v.

See also,
852

P.2d

that

the

evidence, and "all fair, reasonable inferences therefrom," must
be viewed "in a light most favorable to the jury verdict."
at 1021.

Id.

The Court, in Krauss, went on to note that:

This court will not reverse a jury verdict
on the basis of insufficient evidence "unless the
evidence clearly preponderates for the appellant
to the extent that reasonable people could not
differ on the outcome of the case."
Id. at 1021-22 (citations omitted).
In the present case, Ms. Carrier has incorrectly stated
that the evidence showed Pleasant Grove City's stop sign to be
down "one to two days."

As demonstrated by the above-marshaled

evidence, there was testimony at trial from a neighbor to the
intersection that the sign was not down "more than a day or
so."

From that testimony it would be entirely reasonable for
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the jury to have believed that the sign went down within 24
hours of the accident, and possibly on the same day, putting
the City's actions within the acceptable

standard

of care

testified to by all experts at trial, including Ms. Carrier's
own expert.
Ms. Carrier's assertion that the "clear weight" of the
evidence was against the jury verdict is based on assumptions
the jury clearly was not required to make from the testimony
actually presented at trial.

Two critical assumptions Ms.

Carrier claims the jury should have been required to make based
on the evidence were (1) that the subject stop sign was down
more than one or two days, and (2) that Pleasant Grove City
employees
period

actually

when

accident.

the
Since

went

stop

through

the

intersection

during a

sign was down prior to the subject

it was

reasonable, based on all of the

testimony and evidence presented at trial, for the jury to
refuse to make the jump to either of those assumptions, there
clearly existed sufficient competent evidence to sustain the
jury's verdict of 0% negligence on the part of Pleasant Grove
City in this case.
Therefore, the Court should affirm the judgment entered
on the jury's verdict for at least one of two reasons:
Ms.

Carrier

failed to comply with the marshaling
-39-

First,
evidence

requirement

as

clearly

established

by

this

Court.

Second,

considering all of the evidence presented at trial, there was
sufficient competent evidence to sustain a jury's verdict.
III. IT WAS PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE RIGHT-OF-WAY
ISSUE IN THIS CASE ACCORDING TO
THE APPLICABLE UTAH STATUTES.
Although a party is entitled to have his theory of the
case submitted to the jury, a party is not necessarily entitled
to have his version of an instruction given to the exclusion of
a version requested by an opposing party.

The trial court is

required to instruct the jury on the applicable law in a clear
and

understandable

incorporate
instruction

one
to

way.

However,

party's

theory

the

exclusion

of

it
of

is

not

required

negligence

another

party's

into

to
an

theory,

especially when those theories are based on controverted issues
of fact.

See Olson v. R. L. Coats, 717 P.2d 176, 179 (Ore.App.

1986), where the Court holds that "a jury instruction may not
assume the existence of any controverted fact"; and Harris v.
Groth, 645 P.2d 1104, 1108

(Wash.App. 1982), where the Court

held that "instructions should not emphasize certain aspects of
the case which might subject the trial judge to the charge of
commenting on the evidence."
In

the

present

case,

Ms.

Carrier

argues

that

the

evidence at trial supports a finding that "she and defendant
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Smith arrived

at the intersection at approximately

the same

time," and that therefore, the trial court should have limited
its right-of-way
Utah

jury instruction to only subsection

Code Annotated

However,
Carrier
assume

limiting
would

the

§41-6-72.

the

have

jury

instruction

required

existence

of

(Appellant's

the

a

trial

controverted

(2) of

Brief, p. 25).

as requested
court

to

fact,

by Ms.

improperly

i.e.

whether

Smith's van entered the subject intersection clearly ahead of
Ms. Carrier's vehicle, or whether their vehicles arrived at the
intersection at approximately the same time.
In reviewing the jury instructions, arguments were heard
from all counsel regarding this right of way instruction.

Ms.

Carrier's counsel admitted that Instruction #31 to be given by
the court, "in essence", contained his proposed
and

that

it

combined

statutes into one".

"both

of

the

potentially

instruction,
applicable

(R. 2529-30, 2533, 2538)

The problem was that there existed a controverted fact
as to whether Smith entered the intersection first, or whether
he entered the intersection at approximately the same time as
Ms. Carrier.

The trial court properly refused to assume the

existence of the controverted fact in favor of either party,
and instead gave an instruction to the jury incorporating the
law from both subsection

(1) and subsection
-41-

(2) of Utah Code

Annotated §41-6-72.
language

from

Carrier's

the

The Court did not refuse to incorporate
applicable

assumption

of

the

Utah

statute

controverted

favorable
fact,

to Ms.

but

rather

refused to exclude the language of the applicable Utah statute
favorable to Mr. Smith's assumption of the controverted fact.
The instruction given stated the applicable law accurately, and
allowed

the jury to decide

for itself

the factual

issue of

whether Mr. Smith entered the intersection clearly ahead of Ms.
Carrier, or whether their vehicles entered the intersection at
approximately the same time.
Further, Ms. Carrier's counsel had ample opportunity to
argue his case to the jury.

Indeed, Ms. Carrier's

counsel

argued her viewpoint on Instruction #31 at length in closing
argument.

(R. 2586-88)

The jury instructions

are not

the

forum for an unrebutted argument involving a disputed issue of
fact.

Further, other instructions given by the trial court

proposed

plaintiff's

theory

of

the

case.

(R.

812,

Instructions Nos. 22, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30; R. 790, 786, 785,
784, 783, 782)
Thus, considering the subject instruction in the context
of the

instructions

as a whole, it cannot be said that Ms.

Carrier was refused the opportunity to have her theory of the
case submitted to the jury.

Instead, it was proper for the
-42-

trial court to give the right-of-way instruction, based on the
applicable Utah law, without adopting either party's assumption
of a disputed fact.
In addition, Ms. Carrier has failed to show that any
confusion resulted from the right-of-way instruction given, or
that any alleged confusion from the instruction was substantial
and

prejudicial,

regarding

the

as

giving

required
of

an

to

sustain

instruction.

a

claim

Ostler

of

error

v.

Albina

Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App. 1989).

Thus,

Ms. Carrier's claim of error must be rejected, and the judgment
entered on the jury verdict in this case should be affirmed.
IV. FOLLOWING MS. CARRIER'S INTRODUCTION
OF NEWELL KNIGHT'S TESTIMONY INTO THE TRIAL,
IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW MR. KNIGHT TO
TESTIFY REGARDING HIS EXPERT OPINIONS
AND THE BASES THEREOF.
Prior

to

trial,

deposition

of

Newell

designated

by

Pleasant

deposition,

counsel

counsel

Knight,
Grove
for

the

for

Ms.

accident

City.

Pro-Tech

At

Carrier

took

the

reconstructionist
the

questioned

time
Mr.

of

that

Knight

regarding his opinion of whether Smith entered the intersection
clearly ahead of Ms. Carrier, and what that would mean in terms
of right-of-way based on his understanding and experience with
the Utah Traffic Code.

(R. 1075, pp. 81 and 82)
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During the latter portion of the trial in this matter,
Ms.

Carrier's

counsel

requested

the

Court

to

allow

him

to

introduce testimony from the expert retained by Pleasant Grove,
Newell Knight, by way of reading extensively from his crossexamination

of

Mr.

Knight

in

the

pre-trial

deposition.

Pleasant Grove had elected not to have Mr. Knight testify on
its behalf.
Tech's

Ms. Carrier's hope was to try and discredit Pro-

accident

reconstruction

expert

by

using

portions

of

Newell Knight's cross-examination

(Appellant's Brief, p. 28),

without

to

testify

as

he

allowing

Mr.

Knight

conclusions

and

opinions,

deposition.

(R. 1075, pp. 81 and 82)

had

regarding
done

his

own

during

his

Ms. Carrier opened the

door to Mr. Knight's testimony, but then complained that the
door was opened.

She introduces Mr. Knight's testimony into

the trial, then complains his testimony is improper because it
hurts

her

case,

and

now asserts

that

tried to "hide" Mr. Knight from the jury.

defendants

improperly

It seems Ms. Carrier

was having a difficult time making up her mind whether or not
it was

in her best

interest

to have Newell Knight

testify.

Now, with 2 0/2 0 hindsight, Ms. Carrier wishes for Mr. Knight's
testimony to provide a basis for reversing the jury's verdict.
Prior to Ms. Carrier's counsel calling Newell Knight,
the Court

informed

counsel that it would be the defendants'
-44-

choice as to whether Newell would be allowed to take the stand
as a witness.

Pro-Tech's counsel indicated he would not agree

to the reading of Newell's deposition unless he was called as a
witness and took the stand.

The Court ruled Mr. Knight would

have to be called as a witness.

(R. 2403-2404, 2439)

With knowledge of this ruling by the Court, and with
knowledge that Mr. Knight had testified in his deposition that
it was his opinion Smith was in the intersection

first and

would therefore have the right-of-way, counsel for Ms. Carrier
nevertheless chose to call Mr. Knight and introduce the crossexamination

from his deposition.

Counsel

for Pro-Tech

then

questioned Mr. Knight regarding his opinion of whether Smith
entered the intersection first and what that meant in terms of
right-of-way given his understanding and experience with the
Utah Traffic Code.
court explained

that

When Ms. Carrier's counsel objected, the
it had granted examination outside

the

scope of either cross or direct throughout the trial, and since
Mr. Knight was there available to testify, he did not feel it
necessary
only

to

to impose the formality of
Ms.

Carrier's

limiting his

cross-examination

in

the

testimony

deposition.

Also, the court noted that Newell Knight had been called as an
expert, duly qualified, and testified within the scope of that
expertise.
-45-

Thus, where counsel for Pro-Tech was merely questioning
Mr.

Knight

regarding

the

same

opinions

testified

to in his

deposition, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to
allow it.
Rule 3 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals with
the use of depositions in court proceedings.

Subsection

(a)

(4) of that rule states as follows:
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered
in evidence by a party, an adverse party may
require him to introduce any other part which
ought in fairness to be considered with the part
introduced, and any party may introduce any other
parts.
Further, Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence deals
with an expert witness's opinion on the ultimate issue in a
case, and states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (d),
testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact.
As

stated by

the Utah

Supreme

Court

in Whitehead v.

American Motors Sales Corporation, 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990) :
[T] he proper scope of cross-examination is
within the sound discretion of the trial court
and should not be disturbed absent a showing of
abuse.
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Id. at 923-924.
the

Utah

(Citations omitted).

Rules

of

Evidence

See also, Rule 611(b) of

regarding

scope

of

cross-

examination.
In the present
stand,

Ms. Carrier's

case, after calling Mr. Knight to the
counsel

had Mr. Knight

read

extensive

testimony from his deposition regarding calculations on which
he based his opinion of whether Mr. Smith entered the subject
intersection

clearly

ahead

of

Ms.

Carrier.

Under

such

circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to allow counsel for Pro-Tech Restoration to follow up
with

questioning

regarding

Mr.

Knight's

opinions, which

he

claimed were supported by the data, and which he had previously
testified about in his deposition.

It further was not an abuse

of discretion for the trial court to allow Newell Knight to
testify regarding the right-of-way between Ms. Carrier and Mr.
Smith,

based

intersection
understanding
regarding
expert

on

his

opinion

that

Mr.

Smith

entered

the

clearly ahead of Ms. Carrier, and based on his
and

experience

right-of-way

accident

at

with

the

Utah

intersections.

reconstructionist

regarding the right-of-way issue.

had

Traffic

Code

Ms. Carrier's
testified

own

earlier

(R. 1760)

In Randle v. Allen, supra, the plaintiff

asserted

on

appeal that defendant's accident reconstruction expert should
-47-

not have been permitted to testify as to who had the right-ofway.

862 P. 2d at 1337.

However, the Utah Supreme Court held

that:
In light of Haggin's [the proposed accident
reconstruction expert's] extensive experience as
a police officer investigating traffic accidents,
it was not an abuse of discretion to allow him to
testify as to which vehicle should have yielded
the right-of-way at the intersection.
Id. at 1337-38 (explanation added).
Appellant's
1225,

1231

citation

to Davidson v.

Prince,

813

(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P. 2d 651

1991), is not applicable in this case.

P. 2d
(Utah

In Davidson, Mr. Knight

had been asked to testify regarding his opinion with respect to
whether or not the defendant was

"negligent."

That differs

significantly from the instant case, where Mr. Knight was asked
to testify as to his opinion regarding right-of-way, based on
his calculations as to who had entered the intersection first,
and the applicable Utah statute regarding

right-of-way.

In

Davidson, the Court found that Mr. Knight had been asked to
give a "legal conclusion."

Whereas, in the present case, Mr.

Knight had been asked to give an opinion regarding an issue of
fact,

leading to the simple applicability of a Utah statute

regarding

the issue of right-of-way.

Further, the Court of

Appeals' decision in Davidson regarding Mr. Knight's testimony
was actually based on the deference given to trial courts when
-48-

reviewing the admissibility of evidence at trial, recognizing
the trial court's advantageous position with respect to that
issue.
In this case, Ms. Carrier had to be prepared to take the
bitter with the sweet.

By choosing to introduce testimony of

Pleasant Grove's expert, Newell Knight, after Pleasant Grove
had chosen not to call him as a witness, Ms. Carrier chose to
take the risk that Mr. Knight would testify the same as in his
pre-trial deposition regarding his conclusions and opinions, in
addition to the bases for such.
that

the

Knight

to

trial
be

court

abused

questioned

Since Ms. Carrier cannot show

its discretion

and

testify

in allowing Mr.

regarding

his

expert

opinions, the trial court's judgment should not be disturbed by
this Court on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities this
Court should affirm the judgment entered by the Court on the
jury's verdict in this case.
Respectfully submitted this

^ >

day of February, 1995.

HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Pleksant Grove City
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